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is perceived as socially unacceptable behavior frequently serve as a mechanism to distract from the true extent of the problem. If we pay attention to the medium behind the message, we will see how Hunt's 'death by Twitter' is one of a growing number that point to the emergence of a new form of instantaneity enabled by social media and online networked forms of distribution that, under the banner of action, in fact facilitate systemic inaction. I think this requires urgent critical attention, and I aim to show how philosophy and critical theory can help us theorise this apparent paradox.
The German philosopher Martin Heidegger is himself not exactly a paragon of virtue -his one-time association with the German Nazi party continuing to give rise to heated debate. Addressing these issues is outside the scope of this essay, but I wish to focus on something Heidegger noted about human interaction that escaped many other an intellectual mind: the triumph of correctness over truth. This is something that I would argue the scandal around Hunt's remarks, and the developments that followed, illustrated once again in great clarity.
In everyday language we tend to use the terms 'true' and 'correct' interchangeably, but from a Heideggerian point of view this represents a worrying conflation. It is one of many examples where our thinking betrays a fundamental lack of reflexivity, a lack that runs throughout the history of Western thought. Heidegger argues that our traditional understanding of truth goes back to the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, often hailed as the father of logic (Heidegger 2008 (Heidegger [1962 ). It is thanks to Aristotle, Heidegger argues, that truth is seen as the truth of a statement or an assertion. Heidegger uses the example of a person who claims that a picture is hanging askew on a wall without actually looking at it. The truth of this claim will have been established once this person turns around and his assertion meets its object, as it were -the picture on the wall actually hanging askew. So truth has become ingrained in our thinking as the correspondence of a judgment with its object.
However, what is actually happening when the person turns around to see the picture hanging askew on the wall, is that the object discloses itself to the person as hanging in this position, it reveals itself to him as being in this state. The real import of truth, then, is not correspondence, but what Heidegger calls unconcealment
[Unverborgenheit] (Heidegger 2008 (Heidegger [1962 ). The reason being that before we can decide that the statement corresponds with its object, the object needs to reveal itself to us as what it is -only then can it be judged. Thus, there is a prior dimension that the correspondence theory of truth already presupposes, and this is the dimension of unconcealment. This, Heidegger argues, is the proper understanding of the Greek word alētheia, which we translate as truth: openness, un-hiddenness, or unconcealment. Rather than being equivalent to correctness, truth in the sense of openness or unconcealment is the condition for all correctness.
One might argue that this still doesn't mean that what we have traditionally defined as 'truth' is wrong -but this is precisely the point. Whatever is exposed as merely correct is not exposed as an untruth, but merely as an aspect of a wider truth.
Heidegger says:
The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is under consideration. However, in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass. For that reason the merely correct is not yet the true. (Heidegger 1977, p. 6) A correct statement will always stand as such, but as Heidegger says, it won't 'uncover the thing in question in its essence'. The real risk, however, is that in actual terms the correct often tends to obscure the true: where we don't recognise the correct as being only 'partially true', this partial truth tends to be taken for the whole truth and those aspects of the truth that correctness does not cover are lost.
I seems to me that this is what is at stake in the present context: UCL's ousting of Hunt was punishment for behaviour that was undeniably wrong. The question here is not, however, whether this was necessary or not (I would argue that it was not), but the wider, underlying problems that the sacking of Hunt is likely to obscure. By bowing to the calls for Hunt's head UCL has not only silenced the angry voices of social media savvy feminists, but ensured that the whole affair is swept under the carpet to join the pile of media debris already there -a pile so tremendous it is surprising we don't trip over it more often. The serious debates -about why academia continues to be a healthy playground for casual sexism (as in the case of Hunt), and about the underlying structural forms of sexism it continues to sustain (the topic far more deserving of our attention -women still earn less than men doing the same job, as THE recently concluded i ) -debates that could have happened on the back of Hunt, are now not going to happen. This is why playwright and novelist Van Badham has labelled UCL's actions as 'tokenism': Sacking, banning, blocking or removing is the easiest form of punitive action to choose before a baying social media mob, because it immediately blinds everyone to the details of more complex social problems which these controversies allow to be seen -and for which no individual (…) deserves either to be completely exonerated or to shoulder the entire blame. (Badham, 2015) This is not an attempt to exonerate Hunt. He was wrong to say what he did, and we can rest assured that he will repent of these words to the end of his days. I would like to point out, however, that personally I did not feel offended by them. I am speaking as a woman and a scientist myself -although my discipline is the science of how human beings communicate, rather than their biological capacities. Importantly however, I am speaking as someone who has herself been brought to tears by the pressures and frustrations of academic life. I am not ashamed to admit this, and no colleague I know has withstood the pressures of completing a PhD without at times nearing emotional collapse. This aspect of Hunt's remark, however, attracted nowhere near as much controversy as his implied sexism; and it is not only females who suffer: male scientists experience the same pressures, only they often feel less able to speak about their sufferings. As I know from personal experience, many of them simply leave for less stressful and better-paid jobs outside of academia.
So expectation inflation in the HE sector is another debate that is being avoided by such quick fix solutions as the one taken by UCL. Yet these are urgent issues that need addressing. Mental health problems are on the rise in academia (Shaw 2014) , most of them stress-related: a 2008 study conducted by the University and College Union (UCU) amongst almost 15 000 academics in Britain found half of the respondents rated their stress levels as 'high' or 'very high', one third rated theirs 'unacceptable' and 5% responded that they experienced 'unacceptable' levels of stress on a daily basis (Kinman and Wray, 2013) . In their study of academics working in business schools Clarke et al. (2012) demonstrated how the new managerialism and audit culture is able to exploit the traditionally high levels of emotional investment academics have in their work, and the degree to which their identity depends on being a member of this community.
Academia is not the only career that beckons to individuals with high levels of idealism (doctors, teachers), but it is arguably the one where the freedoms and flexibilities (flexible working hours, the ability to work from home, travel to conferences etc.) enjoyed by its members are most often cited as compensation for any hardships endured. Moreover, the traditional construction of academic labour as a 'labour of love' functions as an effective control mechanism that ensures the compliance of academics with the demands of new managerialism (Clarke et al. 2012 and Johnson, 2015) : most effective in the sense that academics comply through the construction of their own identities as people who love what they do. Johnson (2015) quotes a London academic: 'If you find a job that you really enjoy doing then you're not going to do a day's work'.
Karl Marx famously defined the workings of ideology as a 'false consciousness' imposed on the proletariat as a result of a failure to recognize how things really are: they do not know it, but they are doing it, he wrote in Capital (Marx, 1990) . The Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek on the other hand suggests that modern capitalist societies invite a far more cynical understanding of ideology: we know very well, but we are doing it anyway (Žižek 1989) . This notion of ideology is precisely what is playing out in the marketisation of the academy: Academics are well aware of the changes to the system -they are experiencing their effects; they are equally aware of the extent to which these changes are challenging the sustainability of the narrative (academic labour as a labour of love). Nevertheless they are 'ready to comply with performative requirements; indulging in practices of surveillance, self-surveillance and even peer surveillance' (Clarke et al) . Thus in the discourses of academic labour as a 'labour of love' the market has found the most efficient non-violent hegemonic mechanism (Gramsci) for securing compliance: it functions as a 'powerful control mechanism in enabling higher education to reproduce itself often through considerable unpaid labour' (Clarke et al 2012:12) . None of the above will be news to established academics, and those currently seeking to establish themselves will be feeling the pressures even more acutely. The young researchers referred to by Hunt belong in this latter category: already working under extreme conditions in an attempt to finish their doctorates, (if they do -dropout rates are also on the rise) they face increasingly precarious working conditions on the job market and once they have managed to secure that illusive permanent post they face endless rounds of grant applications, all whilst being told they are lucky to events to develop such an ideology? I do not know that this question was ever seriously posed by the Olympic committee. It seems to me her crime is far more likely to have been thoughtlessness, rather than a true antagonism towards Africans based on a belief of racial inferiority. However, the question here is not whether Papachristou is in fact racist or not, nor whether the decision to expel her was justified. What concerns us here is the alacrity of the response: the Olympic committee's decision to expel Papachristou over her thoughtless tweets, similar to UCL's sacking of Hunt 3 years later, was a blow that crushed the more fundamental problems it was meant to strike at. Rather than opening a forum for debate around racism in sports, the Olympic committee's quick and 'decisive' action, a signal made all the more powerful by striking at an athlete who was young, attractive and popular, was in fact a gagging mechanism that will make it easier for racism in sports to persist, for persist it does.
In spring 2015 fans of Chelsea football club were caught on CCTV preventing a black man boarding a Paris metro train, and overall the Football Association reported a 'sharp increase' in racist abuse (Conn, 2015) . Racism amongst fans is merely symptomatic of the racism embedded in the game itself. Whilst professional football in Europe is increasingly showing ethnic diversity amongst the players, coaching and management remains the domain of white males. A study published in the UK in 2014 found that of 552 'top' coaches in professional English football, only 19 were black or from an ethnic minority background (Conway, 2014) . However, where the flag of political correctness is waved in our faces for a brief moment like during the 2012 Olympics, for such is the fickle nature of our attention, these more serious because systemic issues continue to endure.
In Heideggerian terms the banning of Voula Papachristou from participating in the games therefore constitutes another instance of the correct eclipsing the true. As I explained above, Heidegger's argument is not that what we have traditionally understood as 'truth' is in fact false. But our conventional equating of truth with correctness, with the correspondence of a statement with its object, ignores the revealing that needs to take place before such a judgement can be reached. Truth, in the sense of openness or unconcealment, is thus the condition for all correctness.
Where this is not realised, the 'truth' of whatever is being considered, remains hidden -all the more persistently the more we are swayed by the kinds of 'correct determinations' (Heidegger 1977:26) with his left hand whilst stacking the deck with his right. Victims of systems that purport to act whilst not acting, and whose very survival is ensured by Žižek is widely known to be one of the most politically incorrect intellectuals of our time. For this reason alone, it seems to me, his reflections on political correctness are worth engaging with. He sees in it a 'far more dangerous form of totalitarianism' than in traditional exercises of authoritarian power (Žižek 2015) . His favourite example is the comparison between the boy who is told to visit his sick grandmother, and the boy who is coerced into the visit by being reminded of his grandmother's deep affection for him, and the reassurance that nevertheless, he should only visit her if he really wanted to. Where in the former the exercise of power is out in the open, the latter scenario involves an insidious but all the more effective form of power that makes resistance far more difficult. It is this underhand exercise of power that we can see at work in the examples of political correctness discussed here, which I have attempted to construe as signifiers without a signified, or, from Heidegger's perspective, a triumph of correctness over truth with the consequence that the political status quo is upheld rather than challenged.
For Žižek, the paradoxical truth is that it is precisely the opposite of political correctness, namely political incorrectness, that can serve as a means of fostering closeness and understanding -the values associated with PC. Polite inquiries about each other's cultures, he insists, uphold a cold distance as they emphasise difference, where a 'dirty joke' can provide the basis for a lifelong friendship precisely because it assumes something in common before anything else -the ability to share a joke.
Žižek recounts how
[a]t some talk there was a mute and deaf guy and he asked if a translator can be there. And I couldn't resist it. In the middle of the talk in front of 200-300 people, I said what are you doing there guys. My idea was that if you watch the gestures of the translator it looked to me as if some obscene messages or what [sic] . The guy laughed so much we became friends. And some old stupid lady reported me for making fun of crippled people. (Žižek 2015) From here, it is difficult not to recall the incident which occurred during the Nelson Mandela memorial service in 2013, where an interpreter was hired to translate US President Obama's speech into sign language. The interpreter, Thamsanqa Jantjie, claimed a schizophrenic episode caused him to translate Obama's words into gibberish -causing a public outcry and accusations that Jantjie had displayed a lack of respect for the occasion as well as for deaf people everywhere. Once again, Žižek's habitual against-the-grain reading asks us to reconsider: Are they [the signs] not much more intended for us -it makes us (who can hear) feel good to see the interpreter, giving us a satisfaction that we are doing the right thing, taking care of the underprivileged and hindered. Mandela's memorial service first took to Twitter to register something had happened and how it made them feel. Given that we know how each of these stories ended, we don't need London Mayor Boris Johnson's reference to the 'ferocious stinging bees of the twittersphere' (Sky News, 2015) to deduce that social media have the capacity to significantly alter the course of events -certainly the lives of individuals, as has been the case for Hunt, Papachristou and Jantjie.
However, a problem I would like to raise is the under-examined nature of the link between social media and change: the term 'social media' is in itself deeply ideological in that it claims certain inherently positive qualities -user-centred, community-building (Van Dijk, 2013, p. 11 ) -for these media that it denies to older media forms. Further, it automatically seems to imply that any change brought about by these media must also be social and hence good. The idea that social media constitute extremely powerful mechanisms for bringing about social change first gained currency during the series of uprisings referred to as the Arab Spring. Blogger Andrew Sullivan's promise that 'the revolution will be twittered' (Sullivan, 2009) was bandied about euphorically by mainstream media, and taken up with barely less reserve by academics. Since then, thankfully, a growing body of research has tempered this enthusiasm, suggesting that while social media might have facilitated these uprisings, it was still the commitment of people on the ground that really counted. Activists around the world might be using social media to communicate, help mobilise, coordinate -but it turns out email is just as effective here as Facebook,
Twitter etc. (Kavada REF?).
Nevertheless it seems that social media are now firmly bound up with change for the better in the public imagination. I would argue, however, that the 140 characters of a tweet leave no space for the reflexivity that is needed in bringing about the real change needed -whether relating to sexism in academia, racism in sport, or discrimination against people with physical or mental disabilities. Rather, they encourage brief, deeply emotive outbursts like in the case of Tim Hunt's remarks in front of a gathering of female scientists: after his comments were tweeted by a science journalism lecturer at London City University, Hunt quickly became labelled 'chauvinist', 'sexist' and an 'unpleasant dolt'. Gender inequalities in academia need urgent attention as much as they do in boardrooms and government; yet the outcries on social media that have led to the offending figure being removed from the public eye, if anything, only seem to reinforce the stereotypes they are meant to criticise: that in women academics 'emotio', rather than 'ratio', reigns supreme. I am not saying that emotion has no place in the workplace -I hope I have shown that we urgently need to create a more humane environment for us to work in, for both women and men, where we can be open about when we are overwhelmed, where support mechanisms are in place when we need them and where we are not afraid to make use of them. Twitter, however, will not give us this change. Rather, as the case of Hunt has demonstrated, it moves the battle into the arena of the purely symbolic: UCL's public demonstration of a 'no tolerance' policy relegated sexism in the academy to what the German poet Christian Morgenstern would call an Impossible Fact: 'that which must not, can not be' (Morgenstern, 1963, p. 35) .
The obvious question then is, what would an appropriate response to this, and other instances of offended sensibilities, have been? Ironically, I would argue, a recognition of the seriousness of the issue of inequality -and all the examples I have discussed are issues of inequality -requires a tolerance for when it is turned into a joke. This doesn't mean, as Žižek also argues, that it is ok to walk around humiliating others: 'it's a great art how to do it' (Žižek 2015) , and Hunt will certainly not go down as a comic genius. A joke, however, is something we can share as human beings in the face of all kinds of differences, some of which we will not be able to overcome any time soon. But this is my kind of feminism -not an argument that I am in any way better, not an argument that we are the same, but that we are all equal. So I will share the joke, and wait for an opportunity to get my own back. Žižek tells an anecdote about how we like to construe Native Americans as being in touch with nature -in contrast to the exploitative technologies used by white people: this patronising 'New Age bullshit', he emphasises, is where the real racism lies, as it is their 'fundamental right […] to be evil also' (ibid.).
In the meantime, let there be time for real reflexive thinking about how we can address the issues of inequality in a way that does not risk reproducing, again to paraphrase Žižek, if not inequality itself, then at least the conditions for it. This is the essence of Heidegger's warning not to lose sight of the truth when faced with an abundance of (political) correctness.
